Original educational analysis
Notre Dame–Navy: what third-down percentage misses about fourth down
By Sports Forensics editorial analysis
Published October 31, 2026, 09:16 AM PDT · Statistics checked October 31, 2026, 07:57 AM PDT
Navy’s third-down percentage tells only part of the story entering its October 31 game against Notre Dame. Through seven completed games, ending October 24, the Midshipmen converted 35 of 81 third downs, or 43.2%. They also converted 11 of 17 fourth downs, or 64.7%. Those fourth-down successes were additional first downs or touchdowns recorded on a different down; they do not appear in the third-down conversion numerator.
The official Navy game-by-game report reconciles to both season totals. Its fourth-down results were 3-for-3 against Towson, 2-for-3 against Florida Atlantic, 2-for-3 against UAB, 1-for-1 against Air Force, 2-for-3 against Tulsa, 0-for-1 against UTSA and 1-for-3 against North Texas. Adding the successes gives 11; adding the attempts gives 17. That is about 2.4 fourth-down attempts per game, with six attempts that did not convert.
The distinction is particularly visible in the Air Force game on October 3. Navy went 1-for-11 on third down, a 9.1% rate, but converted its one fourth-down attempt. Against Tulsa on October 10, it went 8-for-11 on third down, or 72.7%, and 2-for-3 on fourth. Fourth down therefore supplied another route to extending a possession in two games with very different third-down outcomes.
It would be incorrect to add the two percentages, or to describe 11 fourth-down conversions as 11 of the season’s 46 failed third downs rescued. The tables count conversion attempts, not linked sequences of plays. A possession can contain several third downs, and penalties or other events can change the sequence. Establishing which specific third-down failures were followed by successful fourth-down plays requires the play-by-play.
Nor does the higher fourth-down percentage establish that fourth down was easier. The attempts were selected situations with their own distances, field positions and game states. The report does not supply those conditions alongside these totals, and 17 attempts is a small sample.
For Notre Dame–Navy, the useful observation is whether an apparent third-down stop actually ends the possession, and what distance and field position remain when Navy stays on the field. These historical counts describe how its earlier possessions continued; they do not predict the next decision or its result. No October 31 live statistics are included.
Statistical score projection: Notre Dame 35, Navy 22
This pregame baseline uses each team’s seven completed 2026 games through October 24. Notre Dame scored 288 points and allowed 94; Navy scored 208 and allowed 204. For each projected score, we average that team’s points scored per game with its opponent’s points allowed per game. Notre Dame: (288/7 + 204/7)/2 = 35.14. Navy: (208/7 + 94/7)/2 = 21.57. Rounding to whole points gives 35–22.
This is a simple scoring-average projection, separate from the fourth-down analysis above. It includes all completed games in those samples and does not adjust for opponent strength, venue, pace, player availability or game-day conditions. It has not been validated for forecasting accuracy; the exact score is uncertain. It uses no live October 31 results.